Building & amp; Construction Trades Council v Associated Builders & amp; The Massachusetts/Rhode Island Contractor, Inc. 507 US 218 (1993) is a US employment law case, concerning the scope of federal preemption of state law for labor rights.
Video Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc.
Fakta
A company claims that they do not have to comply with contracts signed with a state government agency, to comply with the terms of a collective agreement because it was promoted by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, a state government agency, was ordered to clean polluting Boston Harbor after failing to prevent waste from flowing in. It orders Kaiser Engineers, Inc. for clearance, and make it agree that it will guarantee the stability of the workforce, and comply with the joint agreement with the Council of Buildings and Trade Construction. Kaiser Inc. and the employers lobby later claimed that this agreement has been agreed under the Labor Relations Act of the National. The District Court rejected the claim. The Court of Appeal permits the claim, saying that the employment agreement, as a condition for performing the work, is a disruption to the bargaining process and not the sort of peripheral rules permitted under the San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon. and Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n . MWRA appealed.
Maps Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc.
Judgment
The Supreme Court declared that state governments could use their funds to get companies to do union or labor-friendly jobs. Blackmun J gives a court decision.
NLRA does not contain clear pre-emption provisions. Therefore, in accordance with the pre-emption principles that have been completed, we should not find the pre-empted "'" pre-empted MWRA offer specifications... unless it goes against federal law or will derail the federal scheme, or unless [we] see from the totality of circumstances that Congress wants to occupy the field to the exclusion of America. "'"... We are reluctant to conclude pre-emption....
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When we say that the NLRA violates state law, we mean that the NLRA prevents the State from regulating in a protected zone, whether it is a protected zone and is reserved for market freedom, see Machinists, or for NLRB jurisdictions, see Garmon. A State shall not govern, however, only by acting in any of these protected areas. When a State owns and manages property, for example, the State must interact with private participants in the market. Thus, the State is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, since the pre-emption doctrine applies only to state regulations.
Our decision in this field supports the difference between government as regulator and government as owner. We have stated consistently that the NLRA is intended to replace state labor regulations, not all legitimate state activities affecting the workforce. In Machinists, for example, we refer to the pre-emptive intent of Congress to "abandon some unregulated activities," 427 US, at 144, 96 S.Ct., at 2555 (emphasis added), and stated that activities in the issue - - work decides together to refuse overtime work - not "can be arranged by the State." Id., At 149, 96 S.Ct., at 2557 (emphasis added). At Golden State I, we argue that the reason Los Angeles can not require the renewal of a taxi franchise on the settlement of labor disputes is that "Prevalence of Machinists... Blocking state and municipal regulations" concerning the behavior that Congress intended to not regulated.. '"475 US, at 614, 106 S.Ct., in 1398 (emphasis added) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 AS, 749, 105 S.Ct., at 2394). to permit the use of its regulatory power abroad from a non-renewable license to restrict the right of the Golden State to use legitimate economic weapons in its dispute with its union See 475 US, 615-619, 106 S.Ct., at 1398-1401. said by petitioners, a very different case would be exposed if the city of Los Angeles purchased a taxi service from Golden State to transport city employees Short for the Petitioners 35. Under the circumstances, if the strike has caused a serious disruption in the services that have been purchased by city, the city should not be prevented from advising the Golden State that it will hire another company if labor disputes do not take place and the service is resumed by a certain deadline.
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The conceptual distinction between the regulator and the buyer exists to some extent within the private sphere as well. A private actor, for example, may participate in a boycott of a supplier on the basis of labor policy concerns rather than a profit motive. See id., At 290, 106 S.Ct., at 1063. Private actors in such circumstances will seek to "regulate" suppliers and will not act as ordinary owners. The fact that a private actor can "organize" is meaningless, of course, that private actors may be "preempted" by the NLRA; The Supremacy clause does not require pre-emption of personal behavior. Therefore private actors can "arrange" at will, as long as their behavior is unlawful. However, as the description above in Gould makes it clear, States have different qualitatively different roles to play from private parties. Id., At 290, 106 S.Ct., in 1063. When the State acts as a regulator, the country performs a role that is typically a government role rather than a private, boycott though. Moreover, as a regulator of private behavior, the State is stronger than the private sector. This difference is far less significant when the State acts as a market actor with no interest in setting policy.
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Allowing States to participate freely in the market is not only consistent with the principle of NLRA pre-emption in general but also, in this case, promotes the legislative objectives that drive the passage of § § 8 (e) and 8 (f) exceptions to the construction industry. In 1959, Congress changed NLRA to add § 8 (f) and modify Ã, § 8 (e). Section 8 (f) explicitly allows employers in the construction industry - but no other companies - to enter into pre-wedding agreements. The prehire agreement is a collective bargaining agreement that provides union recognition, compulsory or compulsory dues, and the mandatory use of union recruitment space, prior to hiring employees.
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It is undeniable that the Agreement between Kaiser and BCTC is a legitimate labor contract under Ã,§Ã,§ 8 (e) and (f). As noted above, the sections explicitly endorse the type of contract between unions and employers such as Kaiser, which is primarily engaged in the construction industry, which includes employees involved in the industry.
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In the instant case, the MWRA acts on the advice of a hired manager to manage the performance of a cleaning work in which, under Massachusetts law, MWRA is the owner. There is no doubt that MWRA strives to ensure efficient projects that will be completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the lowest cost. For the record of the applicant, moreover, Brief for Petitioners 26, the challenging action in this case is specifically tailored for one particular job, the Boston Harbor cleaning project. Therefore there is no basis for differentiating incentives working here from those operating elsewhere in the construction industry, the incentives recognized by this Court as legitimate. View Woelke & amp; Romero Framing Co. v. NLRB , 456 U.S., at 662, and n. 14, 102 S.Ct., in 2081, and n. 14 We assume that the 13.1 Specification Offer is not currently a government regulation and therefore not subject to Garmon and Machinis prequel. Bid Specification 13.1 is a proprietary conduct on the part of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which has legally enforced a valid project labor agreement. As Chief Justice Breyer was appropriately noted in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, "when the MWRA, acting in the role of buyer of construction services, acts exactly as a private contractor will act, and conditions its purchase on some kind of employment agreement that Congress explicitly endorses and expects it often to find , it does not 'regulate' the workings of market forces that Congress expects to find; it exemplifies them. "935 F.2d, at 361...
See also
- US labor law
Note
References
External links
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